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rm hare [an extract from sorting out ethics , ©1997 rm hare, isbn 0-19-823727-8 published by oxford university press.] ... the supreme end, the happiness of all mankind ( krv a851 = b879 = 549) the law concerning punishment is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of happiness, looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of it ... ( rl a196 = b226 = 331) 8.1 . my aim in this chapter is to ask a question, not to answer it. to answer it with confidence would require more concentrated study of kant's text than i have yet had time for. i have read his main ethical works, and formed some tentative conclusions which i shall diffidently state. i have also read some of his english-speaking disciples and would-be disciples, but not, i must admit, any of his german expositors except leonard nelson. but my purpose in raising the question is to enlist the help of others in answering it. to many the answer will seem obvious: for it is an accepted dogma that kant and the utilitarians stand at opposite poles of moral philosophy. this idea has been the current orthodoxy at least since, in the early twentieth century, prichard and ross, deontologists themselves, thought they had found a father in kant. john rawls, in turn, has been deeply influenced by these intuitionist philosophers, and does not think it necessary to document very fully the kantian parentage of their views. as a result, the story that kant and utilitarians have to be at odds is now regularly told to all beginner students of moral philosophy. but is it true? my own hesitant answer would be that it is not. the position is more complicated. kant, i shall argue, could have been a utilitarian, though he was not. his formal theory can certainly be interpreted in a way that allows him - perhaps even requires him - to be one kind of utilitarian. to that extent what j. s. mill says about the consistency of his own views with kant's categorical imperative is well founded (1861: ch. 5, middle). but kant's rigorous puritanical upbringing had imbued him with some moral views which no utilitarian - indeed, which few modern thinkers of any persuasion - would be likely to endorse: about capital punishment, for example, and about suicide, and even about lying. these rigoristic views he does his best (unsuccessfully in the view of most expositors) to justify by appeal to his theory. i shall be looking at some of these arguments. to deontologists who seek to shelter under kant's wing they give small comfort; for if his theory is consistent with one kind of utilitarianism (what kind, i shall be explaining), it does not do them much good if some of his arguments which most people would now reject are anti-utilitarian in tendency. kant was, indeed, a deontologist, in the sense that he assigned a primary place to duty in his account of moral thinking. but he was not an intuitionist of the stamp of prichard and ross. he did not believe, with prichard, that 'if we do doubt whether there is really an obligation to originate a in a situation b, the remedy lies not in any process of general thinking but in getting face to face with a particular instance of the situation b, and then directly appreciating the obligation to originate a in that situation' (1912: s.f.). kant would have called this 'fumbling about with the aid of examples' ( tappen vermittelst der beispiele, gr ba36 = 412). on the contrary, though in the groundwork he respects what he calls 'ordinary rational knowledge of morality', and throughout his writings is happy when common moral convictions support his views, the title of the first chapter shows that he is engaged in a 'transition' from this to 'philosophical knowledge'. the second chapter is called, likewise, 'transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysic of morals'. kant would not have been content, as prichard was and as many of our contemporaries are, and as rawls almost is, to rely on our ordinary moral convictions as data, even after reflecting on them. instead, he developed a highly complex and sophisticated account of moral reasoning : the 'metaphysic of morals'. in this he was right. moral philosophy, which prichard thought rested on a mistake (1912: title), began when socrates and plato, faced with a collapse of popular morality because of the inability of its adherents to provide reasons for thinking as they did, set out in the search for these reasons. kant is in this tradition; prichard and ross are not, and rawls, in some respects their follower, is half in and half out of it. he is only half a rationalist, and half an intuitionist, in that he relies on intuitions altogether too much (h 1973a). this chapter is the beginning of an attempt to rescue kant from some of his modern 'disciples'. 8.2 . i want first to draw attention to some passages in the groundwork which bear on my question. i will start with the famous passage, beloved of anti-utilitarians, about treating humanity as an end. in full it runs: 'act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' ( gr ba66 f. = 429). to understand this we have to know what kant means by 'treat as an end'. he gives us some important clues to this in the succeeding passage, but unfortunately he seems to be using the expression in at least two different senses. broadly speaking, the first and third of his examples, those concerned with duties to oneself, are inconsistent with a utilitarian interpretation, but the second and fourth, those concerned with duties to others, are consistent with it. as we shall see, this difference is no accident. i will take the second and fourth examples first. the second concerns false promises. he combines this with similar examples about 'attempts on the freedom and property of others'. the fault in all such acts lies, he says, in 'intending to make use of another man merely as means to an end he does not share ( in sich enthalte ). for the man whom i seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree with my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share the end of the action'. other people 'ought always at the same time to be treated as ends - that is, only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action'. the fourth example i will quote in full: fourth, as regards meritorious duties to others, the natural end which all men seek is their own happiness. now humanity could no doubt subsist, if everybody contributed nothing to the happiness of others but at the same time refrained from deliberately impairing their happiness. this is, however, merely to agree negatively and not positively with humanity as an end in itself unless every one endeavours also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of others. for the ends of a subject who is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends. i interpret this as meaning that, in order to fulfil this version of the categorical imperative, i have to treat other people's ends (i.e. what they will for its own sake) as my ends. they must be able to do the same, i.e. share the end. in the tugendlehre kant explains the relation between an end and the will as follows: 'an end is an object of the power of choice ( willkür ) (of a rational being), through the thought of which choice is determined to an action to produce this object' ( tgl a4 = 381). we shall be examining later the distinction between ' wille ' and ' willkür ', and the alleged distinction between will and desire. on this, see esp. tgl a 49 = 407, where wille is both distinguished from willkür , and identified with a kind of desire: ' nicht der willkür, sondern des willens, der ein mit der regel, die er annimmt, zugleich allgemeingesetzgebendes begehrun

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